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The William B. Lockhart Lecture
Getting Away from the Federal Paradigm:
Separation of Powers in State Courts
The Honorable Ellen A. Peters*
INTRODUCTION
One of the pleasures afforded to a senior justice, freed from
many of the pressing demands of the judicial agenda, is the
chance to take a step back and to survey the larger legal land-
scape in which state courts function. This vantage point has
provided me with a welcome opportunity to reflect on the state
court system in a personal and impressionistic manner, as a
member of the larger legal community and not strictly as a ju-
rist. Having not enjoyed this vantage point for many years, I
hope for the reader's indulgence in a fledgling effort to explore
new ground.
This is a particularly opportune moment to reflect on the
special role of state courts. Jurisprudentially, the United
States Supreme Court has signaled a renewed respect for the
role of state law in our federal system.' Administratively, the
* Senior Justice of the Supreme Court of Connecticut. This Article is
an edited and footnoted version of remarks that I had the privilege to deliver
on October 15, 1996, as the William B. Lockhart Lecturer at the University of
Minnesota Law School. The Lockhart Lecture Series honors former Univer-
sity of Minnesota Law School Dean William B. Lockhart. I am grateful to the
Dean and the faculty of the Law School for the invitation to give this lecture.
It is a great honor to become associated, in a small way, with the Law School's
distinguished former Dean, and to follow in the footsteps of the distinguished
speakers, some of them my personal friends, who have preceded me in this
lectureship. I want also to acknowledge the fine research and editorial assis-
tance that I have received from my law clerk, Matthew L. Beltramo, J.D.
1996, Yale Law School.
1. The era of the "new federalism" has been proclaimed for over two dec-
ades now. See Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States
Supreme Court, and Democratic Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the
Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 19, 29 (1989) (identifying renewed interest in
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Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts would return
many diversity cases to state courts.2 Politically, devolution of
authority from the federal government to state governments is
the order of the day.3
Nonetheless, an exploration of the academic literature in-
dicates that, with some exceptions, leading contemporary
scholars focus their attention mainly on the work of the federal
courts.4 A reader could easily infer that the federal courts
alone furnish the appropriate paradigm for any serious, in-
state constitutions). Even so, recent Supreme Court decisions serve to rein-
force the limitations on congressional power over the states. See, e.g., Semi-
nole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1133 (1996) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment restricts Congress's power to authorize suits against states pur-
suant to Article I); United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1650-51 (1995)
(invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990).
2. COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 29-32
(1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN]. The Long Range Plan includes 93
specific recommendations aimed predominantly at abating the increase in the
federal caseload. Id. at 23. In addition to reducing the number of diversity
cases currently on the federal docket, these recommendations also include
removing to state courts most ERISA, FELA, and maritime cases. Id. at 34-
35; see also Jon 0. Newman, Determining the Proper Allocation of Cases Be-
tween Federal and State Courts, 79 JUDIcATURE 6, 6-7, 46 (1995) (advocating a
system of discretionary access to federal courts).
3. One of the salient features of the recently enacted welfare reform bill
is the appropriation of block grants to the states in order to "increase the
flexibility of States" in administering the national welfare program. 42
U.S.C.A § 601(a) (West Supp. 1996).
The dissatisfaction with the federal bureaucracy and the renewed interest
in states' rights are themes that have also resonated in presidential politics.
So while President William Clinton has officially declared that "[tlhe era of
big Government is over," Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the
State of the Union, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 90, 90 (Jan. 23, 1996), his
Republican adversary, former Senator Robert Dole, reportedly carries with
him a copy of the Tenth Amendment as a token of his own support for states'
rights. See David Hosansky, Reshaping the Federal-State Relationship, 54
CONG. Q. WLY. REP. 2824, 2824 (1996).
4. Although Justice William J. Brennan's famous article, State Constitu-
tions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977),
has justly been credited with sparking renewed jurisprudential interest in
state constitutions, this interest has yet to manifest itself in equalization of
the vast disproportions in federal versus state scholarship. See ROBERT F.
WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1-2 (2d ed. 1993) (noting that lawyers
and law schools have largely confined the study of constitutional law to the
federal Constitution). The AALS Directory of Law Teachers 1995-96 is illumi-
nating. It lists more than 10 pages of scholars of constitutional law, but has
no listing for state constitutional law. AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS
1995-96, at 1045-57 (Association of American Law Schools ed., 1995-1996).
Even more tellingly, it lists five pages of scholars whose subject is federal
courts, but lists no scholars whose subject is state courts. Id. at 1118-22.
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formed analysis of the court systems in this country. The aca-
demic community seems to regard state courts as minor ver-
sions of federal courts, like third cousins once removed. Since
state courts concededly dispose of large numbers of cases,
vastly more than the federal courts,5 the dearth of scholarly
commentary suggests that state court decisions are relatively
unimportant and merely reflect the work product of under-
qualified judges burdened by inadequate resources.
In all candor, state judicial resources are strained almost
everywhere.6 It would be unduly optimistic to anticipate
greater legislative largesse in the near future. The other as-
sumptions of the federal paradigm are, however, no longer
true, if ever they were.
State courts, by conservative estimates, conduct ninety-
five percent of the judicial business in this country.7 From my
biased perspective as a former president of the Conference of
Chief Justices, they do so effectively and creatively. State
courts succeed by drawing on their own heritage, their own
constitutions, their own common law, and their own statutes to
craft and apply a broad range of jurisprudential principles that
often differ substantially from those that govern the federal
courts. State courts might, of course, more completely satisfy
these serious responsibilities if their work had the benefit of
sustained academic input.
An exploration of the independence and strength of the state
courts in our federal system could start from any number of van-
tage points. One would be the renewed commitment by state
courts to enforcement of the provisions of state constitutions.
8
5. In 1993, for example, 35 million cases, including 13 million criminal
cases, were filed in state trial courts. See BRIAN J. OSTROM & NEAL B.
KAUDER, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF
STATE COuRTs, 1993: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS
PROJECT at viii (1995) (indicating that in 1993 state courts handled 20 million
civil and domestic relations cases, 13 million criminal cases, and nearly 2 mil-
lion criminal cases, as well as 55 million traffic and ordinance violations). At
the same time, less than 280,000 cases were filed in federal district courts.
LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 2, at 16.
6. This strain often appears even more pronounced when a state court
system is compared with its federal counterpart. See Judge Harold Baer, Jr.,
A View from Two Courthouses, N.Y. L.J., June 13, 1996, at 2 (comparing New
York trial court with Manhattan federal district court).
7. Cf. OSTROM & KAUDER, supra note 5, at 3 (estimating that state
courts perform 98% of adjudication).
8. In the area of individual rights, the Supreme Court's more recent in-
terpretations of the protections available under the federal Constitution serve
15451997]
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Another would be the ongoing commitment by state courts to
improve their capacity to deal with changing case flow needs. 9
For now, however, this Article will address a more basic
topic: the doctrine of separation of powers. Jurisprudentially,
separation of powers represents a view of the body politic that,
although not a prerequisite to a republican form of govern-
ment, is nonetheless fundamental to any discussion of the ap-
propriate ordering of governmental responsibilities, state or
federal.' ° Operationally, separation of powers provides doc-
as an invitation to state courts to develop, where appropriate, more expansive
rights derived from the provisions of their own constitutions. See Brennan,
supra note 4, at 502 (positing that decisions based on the federal Constitution
are not necessarily dispositive in issues of state law); James G. Exum, Jr., Re-
discovering State Constitutions, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1741, 1748 (1992) (explaining
that some state constitutions provide more protections than the federal Con-
stitution and that state courts must enforce them); see also Lawrence Gene
Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1259-64 (1978) (indicating that states will in-
creasingly rely on provisions of state constitutions in defining governmental
values, but also arguing that state courts should have more leeway to enlarge
an underenforced federal constitutional norm); Randall T. Shepard, The Ma-
turing Nature of State Constitution Jurisprudence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 421,
444-56 (1996) (discussing "free speech" and "equal protection" analyses based
on state constitution free expression and equal privileges and immunities
clauses).
9. Budgetary restraints have forced state court judges and administra-
tors from all parts of the country to explore more efficient ways of court man-
agement. See ROBERT W. TOBIN, FUNDING THE STATE COURTS: ISSUES AND
APPROACHES 13-23 (1996) (cataloguing suggestions for improving court man-
agement made during the National Interbranch Conference on Funding State
Courts, including entrepreneurial management techniques, organizational
unification, and geographic reorganization). In some states, legislative initia-
tives intended to stiffen penalties on repeat offenders have further challenged
courts to stretch resources to accommodate a mushrooming caseload. See
Laurie D. Zelon, Three Strikes and We're Out, L.A. L., Nov. 1995, at 13
(arguing that Los Angeles County practitioners must help courts by lobbying
for more trial court funding and additional judgeships, given the overwhelm-
ing volume of criminal cases and the anticipated additional burden of the
"three strikes" law).
10. For a discussion of the manner in which the Framers conceived of and
acted upon separation of powers principles, see Gerhard Casper, An Essay in
Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 211 (1989).
In Calder v. Bull, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether
the Connecticut legislature had violated two clauses of the federal Constitu-
tion, the clause requiring states to have a republican form of government
(Article IV, § 4) and the clause forbidding the states from enacting an ex post
facto law (Article I, § 10). 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387-89 (1798). At issue was the
action of the Connecticut legislature to set aside the judgment of a state pro-
bate court and to order a new probate hearing to be held. Id. at 386.
Only Justice Chase addressed the first issue specifically. He concluded
[Vol. 81:15431546
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trinal guideposts for courts to consider when drawing the line
between the role of the judiciary and the role of popularly
elected political institutions." Politically, separation of powers
safeguards the independence of the courts while providing a
principled foundation for appropriately defined judicial defer-
ence to the views of other community policymakers.
1 2
that the vital principles inherent in a republican form of government must be
evaluated in the context of a challenge to particular legislation. Id. at 388.
"An act of the legislature (for I cannot call it a law), contrary to the great first
principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of
legislative authority." Id. Only specifically impermissible acts, such as one
punishing a citizen for acts legal when done, or impairing lawful private con-
tracts, fall within the general principles of law that a legislature may not en-
act. Id. The remainder of his opinion focused on the ex post facto issue and
found no violation of that constitutional prohibition in the absence of a retro-
active change in a law affecting a criminal defendant. Id. at 389-91.
In a concurring opinion, while agreeing about the scope of the Ex Post
Facto Clause, Justice Iredell also alluded to the fundamental question of
whether a legislature rightfully has the authority to overturn judicial deci-
sions. Id. at 398. His comments on this score suggest that by 1798 the con-
cept of legislative dominance over the judiciary had already lapsed into
anachronism. He wrote:
It may, indeed, appear strange to some of us, that in any form, there
should exist a power to grant, with respect to suits depending or ad-
judged, new rights of trial, new privileges of proceeding, not previ-
ously recognized and regulated by positive institutions; but such is
the established usage of Connecticut, and it is obviously consistent
with the general superintending authority of her Legislature.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
With Connecticut as a counterpoint, Justice Iredell moved into a discus-
sion of the proper separation of governmental branches, drawing largely on
the country's recent experience with constitution making:
In order.., to guard against so great an evil [as legislative omnipo-
tence], it has been the policy of all the American states, which have,
individually, framed their state constitutions since the revolution,
and of the people of the United States, when they framed the federal
Constitution, to define with precision the objects of the legislative
power, and to restrain its exercise within marked and settled
boundaries.
Id. at 399 (emphasis omitted). Because of the "delicate and awful nature" of
the issue, Justice Iredell did not go so far as to invalidate the Connecticut
legislature's authority to superintend its judiciary. Id. His opinion, however,
serves to underline the emerging centrality of separation of powers principles
in American political philosophy in the immediate post-Revolutionary period.
11. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447, 1456-57,
1463 (1995) (invalidating § 27A(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on
grounds that § 27A(b) unduly abrogates judicial power by requiring federal
courts to reopen final judgments and is therefore violative of separation of
powers principles); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)
(identifying standing doctrine as a "landmark" to guide federal courts in de-
termining whether they can properly hear a case).
12. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 333-37 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
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An overview of how separation of powers works, as a mat-
ter of state law, is a useful lens for bringing into focus a variety
of significant differences between the work of the state courts
and the work of the federal courts. Three major sources of dif-
ference are illustrative:
(1) some state courts have a constitutional history with re-
spect to the separation of powers that differs from that of the
federal courts;13
(2) many state courts confront, under the general rubric of
the separation of powers, legal issues that differ from those en-
countered in the federal courts; 14 and,
(3) most state courts, in their daily operations, deal with
separation of powers in a manner that differs from the opera-
tions of the federal courts) 5
I. THE EFFECT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORIES ON THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS DOCTRINE
Let me start with differences in constitutional history and
heritage. The renewed state court interest in independent con-
struction and application of the provisions of state constitutions
has sparked, as one of its salutary by-products, an exploration of
the sources of our own home-grown organic documents. Of ne-
cessity, my principal point of reference on this topic will be the
constitutional history of Connecticut. 6
Cooke ed., 1961) (arguing that the legislative, judicial, and executive branches
must have some degree of power over one another in order to preserve their
distinct roles).
13. See infra Part I (discussing the effect of constitutional history on the
separation of powers doctrine).
14. See infra Part II (discussing the different legal issues that the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine raises in state courts).
15. See infra Part III (discussing the effect of the separation of powers
doctrine on the functioning of the state courts).
16. For a sampling of historical research on other state constitutions, see,
for example, PETER J. GALIE, ORDERED LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF NEW YORK (1996); John Cornyn, The Roots of the Texas Constitu-
tion: Settlement to Statehood, 26 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1089, 1119-89 (1995); Jack
Nordby, Thirty-Two Reflections on the Birth, Slumber and Reawakening of the
Minnesota Constitution, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 245, 251-67 (1994); John V.
Orth, North Carolina Constitutional History, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1759, 1759-96
(1992); and David Schuman, The Creation of the Oregon Constitution, 74 OR.
L. REV. 611, 611-41.
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A. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
Connecticut constitutional history begins with a 1639
document, known as the Fundamental Orders, memorializing
the undertaking of three towns along the Connecticut River to
"associate and conjoin [themselves] to be as one Public State or
Commonwealth" and to describe the laws and rules by which
their affairs were to be governed. 7 The Fundamental Orders
were supplemented by the Ludlow Code of 1650, which itself
contained a detailed Declaration of Human Rights. 8 Inspired
by natural law principles and framed in the terms of consen-
sual compacts, these early documents anticipated what, thirty
years later, John Locke would come to describe as a social con-
tract.' 9 Although largely statutory in form, they were treated,
in colonial times, with the respect we accord to constitutional
charters. Referring to a time substantially pre-dating the
adoption of our federal Constitution, Professor Christopher
Collier, the Connecticut state historian, notes that "[tihe
[Connecticut] Declaration and supplementary statutes relating
to individual rights were... viewed as inviolate. Abridgments
perpetrated by the government were considered void on their
face and courts were to refuse to enforce them."20
Local Connecticut leaders thereafter drafted subsequent
governmental charters, each of which was approved, essen-
tially unaltered, by reigning English monarchs.2' Connecticut's
17. MARY JEANNE ANDERSON JONES, THE FuNDAMENTAL ORDERS OF
CONNECTICUT 55-60 (1988).
18. See Henry S. Cohn, Connecticut Constitutional History: 1636-1776, 64
CONN. B.J. 330, 336 (1990) (describing the Ludlow Code of Laws).
19. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT §§ 95-122 (Peter
Laslett ed., Cambridge University Press 1988) (1690) (arguing that by agree-
ing to live in a society, a person consents to living by the rules of the majority,
and that this consent, or social compact, relinquishing full freedom, is neces-
sary to forming societies); see also Suri Ratnapala, John Locke's Doctrine of
Separation of Powers: A Re-Evaluation, 38 AM. J. JURIS. 189, 196-220 (1993)
(discussing Locke's theory of separation, the historical context of its origin,
and its impact on constitutional theory).
20. Christopher Collier, The Connecticut Declaration of Rights Before the
Constitution of 1818: A Victim of Revolutionary Redefinition, 15 CONN. L.
REV. 87, 94 (1982).
21. This includes the Royal Charter of 1662, which, following the political
tumult of the Glorious Revolution, was reratified by King William in 1694.
See Cohn, supra note 18, at 337-43 (discussing the charters from 1660-1698).
The 1662 Charter functioned, more or less, like a constitution. It set forth the
structure of government, dictated how that government would function, and
guaranteed citizens the "liberties and immunities" available in England. See
id. at 339 (describing the charter).
15491997]
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colonial government had the good fortune never to be burdened
by the imposition of either royal governors or royal judges.'
Whatever its other charms, Connecticut's lack of a major sea-
port probably accounts for England's benign neglect.
Because of Connecticut's long history of self-governance,
the Revolution in 1776 occasioned no dramatic changes.23
Connecticut simply reenacted its then-existing charter "under
the sole authority of the people [of Connecticut], independent of
any king or prince whatever."24 The then-governor of Connecti-
cut, Jonathan Trumbull, helped to lead the Revolution and or-
ganized Connecticut support for the Declaration of Independ-
ence. In due course, Connecticut adopted the novel federal
Constitution of 1787 but saw no urgent need for in-state change.
The colonial documents established in Connecticut a form
of government in which a General Assembly, selected by and
composed of residents of Connecticut, was the repository of all
ultimate power, executive, legislative, and judicial. Until
1784, the highest court in Connecticut was the General As-
sembly; thereafter, until 1818, when Connecticut finally
adopted a formal constitution, the state's appellate tribunal
was the legislature's upper house, led by the governor.26 In
form and function, the government of Connecticut mirrored
that of the English Parliament. Notably, although Connecti-
cut's early government manifested an immediate and sus-
tained commitment to the protection of individual rights, this
political philosophy coincided with the conspicuous absence of
any notion of separation of powers.27
22. See Wesley W. Horton, Connecticut Constitutional History: 1776-1988, 64
CONN. B.J. 355, 357 (1990) (noting that England essentially ignored Connecticut).
23. See Christopher Collier, William J. Hammersley, Simeon E. Baldwin,
and the Constitutional Revolution of 1897 in Connecticut, 23 CONN. L. REV.
31, 33 (1990) ("[Iin a conscious assertion of its pre-Revolutionary autonomy,
Connecticut continued its government under the Charter of 1662 merely by
purging any mention of the King.").
24. See Horton, supra note 22, at 357 (quoting the General Assembly of
1776).
25. See Collier, supra note 20, at 37 ('Under the Charter [of 1662] and
local concepts of natural law, the General Assembly was omnipotent.").
26. See EVERETT C. GOODWIN, THE MAGISTRACY REDISCOVERED: CON-
NECTICUT, 1636-1818, at 85 (1981) (discussing the change in Connecticut law
that transferred authority for the law's interpretation and articulated a sepa-
ration of powers involved in the activity of legal application).
27. Collier notes that "[i]n the period before [the Constitution of] 1818,
neither the principle nor the practice of separation of powers played any part
in Connecticut government." Collier, supra note 20, at 35-36.
1550 [Vol. 81:1543
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It is a treasured part of Connecticut lore that the adoption
of the constitution of 1818 resulted in substantial part from
Lung's Case.28 In 1815, Lung was tried and convicted for the
crime of murder in a trial presided over by Zephaniah Swift, a
distinguished and learned chief judge of the superior court.29
Swift was reconciled to the possibility that, despite substantial
evidence of Lung's guilt, the General Assembly might grant
Lung's request for a pardon. But Swift was outraged when the
General Assembly decided instead, sua sponte, to order a new
trial for Lung.30 The General Assembly's action displaced the
established appeal route which was then to the legislature's
own upper house.
Swift argued, far and wide, that such a legislative power
play was intolerable. Jurisprudence in the courts, he said,
could not coexist with unconstrained, politically-minded legis-
lators exercising "an absolute and uncontrollable power over all
the rights of the people."31 Swift was persuasive. The constitu-
tion of 1818, for the first time in Connecticut's constitutional his-
tory, included provisions formally distinguishing between the
separate powers of the three branches of government.32
Despite this textual breakthrough, the mindset of the past
continued to exercise considerable influence for most of the
nineteenth century.33 Scholarly commentaries by Swift34 and
Chief Justice Jesse Root35 written around the turn of the cen-
tury referred freely, and without much distinction, to princi-
ples derived from natural law, common law, and statutes as
sources of fundamental authority. Even after the adoption of
the 1818 constitution, the judiciary continued to defer to legis-
lative policymakers by looking to statutory guidance for the in-
28. Lung's Case, 1 Conn. 428 (1815).
29. ZEPHANIAH SwIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF
CONNECTICUT (1795-1796) is generally regarded as the first textbook on
American common law. See GOODWIN, supra note 26, at 95 (discussing the
development of the separation of powers in Connecticut).
30. See GOODWIN, supra note 26, at 112-15 (analyzing Swift's actions in
light of the General Assembly's decision).
3L See id. at 113 (discussing separation of powers in Connecticut).
32. CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. II.
33. See Collier, supra note 20, at 48 (u[E]ven after the constitution of 1818
was in place, the [Connecticut Supreme Court] continued to construe judicial
review in natural law terms rather than on constitutional principles.").
34. See supra note 29 (discussing Swift's textbook on American common
law).
35. Jesse Root, Introduction to 1 ROOT'S REPORTS at i-xlvi (Banks Law
Publ'g Co. 1899) (1798).
1997] 1551
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
terpretation of constitutional text. Tellingly, in 1831, a Con-
necticut Supreme Court decision described the new constitution
as a limitation on, but not an abrogation of, the plenary author-
ity of the legislature.36
It was only at the end of the century, in 1897, that a Con-
necticut case held a legislative act unconstitutional because it
assigned to the judiciary non-judicial functions and, therefore,
violated separation of powers principles." Before and after
that time, despite repeated allusions to the existence of a
power of judicial review of legislative actions, that power has
been exercised only rarely.
The Connecticut history with regard to separation of powers
stands in marked contrast, therefore, to that of the federal Consti-
tution. The federal Constitution incorporates principles of sepa-
ration of powers through the creation of separate executive, legis-
lative, and judicial departments 38 and concomitant provisions for
checks and balances. 39 Having anticipated Locke, Connecticut, for
a significant period of time, bypassed Montesquieu.4 °
B. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF OTHER STATES
What about other states? Massachusetts had a different
colonial heritage, colored by numerous perceived injustices at
36. Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn. 541 (1831). In Starr, the Connecticut Su-
preme Court was called upon to decide whether the legislature, in granting a
divorce to the plaintiff, had violated the separation of powers clause of the
1818 constitution. The supreme court, led by Chief Justice David Daggett,
himself an opponent of the early nineteenth century constitutional movement,
held that it had not. Daggett reasoned that the new constitution was not an
enabling document that authorized the legislature to act only in certain, well-
defined areas. Rather, the constitution placed limitations on the powers of
the legislature as they had existed prior to 1818. So construed, the constitu-
tion left the legislature largely free to function as it had in the past, con-
strained only by explicit textual limitations. See Horton, supra note 22, at
361-62 (examining the role of the legislature under Connecticut's constitu-
tional separation of powers in light of Starr v. Pease).
37. Appeal of Norwalk St. Ry. Co., 37 A. 1080, 1089 (Conn. 1897) (holding
it unconstitutional to vest power in the judiciary to approve of location of
trolley lines).
38. See U.S. CONST. art. I (executive); id. art. II (legislative); id. art. I
(judicial).
39. See, e.g., id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (congressional power to try all impeach-
ments); id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (presidential veto); id. art. II. § 2, cl. 2 (senatorial
advice and consent required for treaties and appointments).
40. CHARLES MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (Thomas Nugent trans.,
David Wallace Carrithers ed., 1977).
[Vol. 81:15431552
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the hands of various royal mandates." Not surprisingly,
revolutionary political leaders drafting the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780 provided expressly for the separation of
powers.42 Other states, including Maryland,43 New Hamp-
shire,' North Carolina,45 and Virginia,46 did likewise. As other
states joined the union, they too followed the path charted by
these early states. When Minnesota achieved statehood in
1858, its constitution incorporated particularly strong separa-
tion of powers provisions.47
These diverse histories demonstrate that even though
state constitutional provisions may textually resemble those
found in the federal Constitution, they may reflect distinct
state identities that will result in differences in how courts
apply and construe such texts. Far from being arbitrary depar-
tures from a superior federal model, these interpretations have
the legitimacy of differences rooted in the past and adaptable
for the future.
41. For example, in a petition supporting the concept of popularly elected
county officials, Reverend Thomas Allen of Pittsfield, Massachusetts reminded
his countrymen that:
We have been ruled in this Country for many years past with a rod of
Iron. The Tyranny, Despotism & oppression of our fellow Subjects in
this Country have been beyond belief.... We find ourselves in Dan-
ger of [returning] to our former state & of undergoing a Yoke of
Op[pression] which we are no longer able to bear.
Reverend Thomas Allen, Petition of Pittsfield, December 26, 1775, in MAS-
SACHUSETTS, COLONY TO COMMONWEALTH: DOCUMENTS ON THE FORMATION OF
ITS CONSTITIMON, 1775-1780, at 18 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1961).
42. MASS. CONST. of 1780, Part the First, art. XXX.
43. MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. 8.
44. N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. 1, art. 37.
45. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 4.
46. VA. CONST. of 1788, art. 1, § 5. Thomas Jefferson observed that a
major defect in the 1781 version of the Virginia state constitution was that it
permitted concentration of power in the legislative branch. See THOMAS
JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 120 (William Peden ed., 1954)
(advocating that the powers of government be divided and balanced among
several bodies).
47. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The powers of government shall
be divided into three distinct departments: legislative, executive and judicial.
No person or persons belonging to or constituting one of these departments
shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others ex-
cept in the instances expressly provided in this constitution.").
1997] 1553
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II. THE LEGAL EFFECT OF SEPARATION OF
POWERS IN STATE COURTS
For many state courts, the legal issues that the separation
of powers doctrine raises differ from those encountered in the
federal courts. These issues tend to involve areas of tension
between legislative and judicial authority, and have only
rarely, if at all, concerned limitations on the non-budgetary
authority of the executive branch. Additionally, even within
the separation of legislative and judicial powers, state courts,
for structural as well as textual reasons, have dealt with many
issues that have no federal counterpart.
As a structural matter, one of the flash points of conflict
for state courts has been the question of who determines the
rules of judicial procedure. This is not an open question in the
federal system, in which that authority unambiguously belongs
to Congress,48 although it has been delegated to the Supreme
Court.49 In Connecticut," however, as in Minnesota,5' hegemony
48. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 387 (1989) ("'Congress has
undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts .... '"
(quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941)).
49. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994) (delegating authority to federal courts to
prescribe rules of conduct); id. § 2072 (delegating authority to the Supreme
Court to prescribe rules of practice, procedure, and evidence).
50. The Connecticut Supreme Court addressed this issue in State v.
Clemente, 353 A.2d 723, 727-28 (Conn. 1974). There, we held that an act re-
quiring trial courts to order disclosure of a prosecution witness's statements
infringed on the inherent power of the Connecticut Supreme Court to control
discovery and therefore violated the separation of powers principles of the
Connecticut Constitution. Twenty years later, however, we upheld the consti-
tutionality of a statute that permitted counsel, during closing arguments, to
suggest an appropriate monetary recovery. Bartholomew v. Schweizer, 587
A.2d 1014 (Conn. 1991). In Bartholomew, we observed that, at least with re-
spect to the control over oral argument, judicial and legislative authority may
properly coexist. See id. at 1018 (noting that the "court's authority [is not] ex-
clusive of concurrent legislative authority"). Later Connecticut Supreme
Court opinions have construed Bartholomew to have overruled, or at least un-
dermined, the validity of the holding in Clemente. See, e.g., State v. Diaz, 628
A.2d 567, 590 (Conn. 1993) (Berdon, J., dissenting) ("Clemente, however, was
finally put to rest by our decision in Bartholomew . . . ."). For a pre-
Bartholomew discussion of this issue, see Richard S. Kay, The Rule-Making
Authority and Separation of Powers in Connecticut, 8 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1975)
(focusing on the allocation of power between the legislature and judicial
branches under the constitutional law of Connecticut as pronounced in State
v. Clemente.
51. See Maynard E. Pirsig & Randall M. Tietjen, Court Procedure and the
Separation of Powers in Minnesota, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 141 (1989)
(discussing the constitutional dimensions of rule-making authority in Minne-
sota).
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over court procedures has long been a troublesome issue. The
issue may arise with respect to specific legislation purporting
directly to regulate some aspect of the conduct of trials. 2 Al-
ternatively, it may arise with respect to legislation, such as a
mandatory open meeting law, that is general in form but
that, in its application, may interfere with judicial proceed-
ings such as settlement conferences or rules committee con-
ferences. 3 Despite best efforts to minimize such points of
conflict, state courts recurrently have had to resist legislative
acts that seriously intrude into judicial authority over such
judicial agendas.
A. EFFECT ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Structural considerations do not invariably point to con-
flict. Consider, for example, the role of courts in statutory
construction. Most state court judges, like most federal
judges, take a mainstream view of statutory construction.
Contrary to the views of Justice Antonin Scalia,54 state court
judges construe statutes by assessing not only the statutory
text but also the policy that the legislature has sought to im-
plement.
In undertaking to interpret statutory text and to implement
statutory policies, however, the state courts differ from the fed-
eral courts in an important respect. State courts have the oppor-
tunity to consider not only the entire body of statutory enact-
ments but also the large reservoir of common law principles that
continue to fall exclusively within the judicial domain. The
52. See Bartholomew, 587 A.2d at 1018 (allowing coexistence of the regu-
lation of oral argument between judicial and legislative branches).
53. See Rules Committee v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 472 A.2d 9, 15
(Conn. 1984) (holding that a rule-making committee meeting is not an
"administrative hearing" for purposes of Connecticut Freedom of Information
Act); see also Margaret S. DeWind, Note, The Wisconsin Supreme Court Lets
the Sun Shine In: State v. Showers and the Wisconsin Open Meeting Law,
1988 WIS. L. REV. 827, 830 (discussing privacy as a shield from "electoral ret-
ribution" for Wisconsin politicians); Note, What Constitutes a Meeting Under
the Minnesota Open Meeting Law?, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 251, 265 (1985)
(discussing privacy as a shield from electoral retribution for Minnesota politi-
cians).
54. For a critique of Justice Scalia's approach to statutory construction,
see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 262-69 (1990).
For a slightly different view of Justice Scalia's jurisprudence, see Bradley C.
Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statu-
tory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 401, 402 (1994) (arguing that
Scalia's new textualism is neither "new" nor strictly "textualist).
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federal courts, by contrast, can draw on very little by way of
federal common law to assist them in statutory construction.5 5
Access to common law principles is a two-way street for
state courts. On one hand, common law constructs are a ready
source of context and definition to flesh out ambiguities in
statutory language. On the other hand, statutorily defined
policies can have a spill-over impact on common law doctrines.
Historically, state courts have taken the position that, in
case of conflict between legislation and the common law, it is
the legislation that should be restricted in its impact, princi-
pally through narrow construction of the statute. 6 More re-
cently, though, state courts have entertained the possibility
that there are cases in which, in response to far-reaching legis-
lative policy decisions, it is the common law that should be
modified."
B. SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS
A recent Connecticut example of such common law adap-
tation arose in the context of legislation that altered the juris-
dictional ground rules for child support but not for alimony. 8
We recognized that family dissolution cases would often raise
both of these issues, and that, practically speaking, they would
often be closely intertwined. We therefore modified our com-
mon law rules for alimony to conform to the statutory rules for
support. 9
55. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) (holding that fed-
eral courts, unlike state courts, "do not possess a general power to develop
and apply their own rules of decision"). For a dialogue on the legitimacy of
federal common law, compare Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83
Nw. U. L. REv. 805 (1989) and The Curious Notion That the Rules of Decision
Act Blocks Supreme Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 860 (1989), with
Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law and American Political Theory: A
Response to Professor Weinberg, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 853 (1989) (debating the
federal judiciary's ability to promulgate rules of federal common law).
56. See GuiDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 4
n.15 (1982) (discussing the changes and problems associated with the Ameri-
can legal system's movement from the common law to a statute-based sys-
tem).
57. See id. at 5 ("[Ulnlike earlier codifications of law, which were so gen-
eral that common law courts could continue to act pretty much as they always
had, the new breed of statutes were specific, detailed, and "'Well drafted"); see
also Ellen A. Peters, Common Law Judging in a Statutory World: An Address,
43 U. PITr. L. REV. 995, 1005-06 (1982) (discussing the appropriate bounda-
ries in which to consider statutes).
58. Fahy v. Fahy, 630 A.2d 1328 (Conn. 1993).
59. Id. at 1333.
[Vol. 81:15431556
SEPARATION OF POWERS
In reaching this result, we were, perhaps unconsciously,
echoing the historical deference of Connecticut courts to legis-
lative authority. From another point of view, however, we were
turning separation of powers on its head. Instead of emphasiz-
ing separate judicial and legislative magistracies, we were us-
ing our authority over the common law to find an accommoda-
tion between the two branches. There is no readily discernible
parallel in the federal courts to the capacity of state courts to
craft a legal landscape that encompasses and harmonizes
statutory and common law principles.
In addition, specific textual provisions that may or may not
co-exist in federal and state constitutions may require unique
state applications of the separation of powers doctrine. For ex-
ample, in Minnesota,60 as under federal law,61 specific legislative
authority to decide the eligibility of members of the legislature
arguably casts doubt on the jurisdiction of a court to intervene.62
Some state constitutional provisions leave little room for doubt
on that score, however. For example, Connecticut has adopted a
constitutional amendment requiring a balanced budget.63 The
test for determining whether a budget is balanced requires the
legislature to analyze the budget's component parts in accor-
dance with definitions that the amendment expressly directed
60. The Minnesota Constitution provides: "Each house shall be the judge
of the election returns and eligibility of its own members." MINN. CONST. art.
IV, § 6.
61. The Constitution provides: "Each House shall be the Judge of the
Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own members...." U.S. CoNST.
art. I, § 5, cl. 1. But see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 514 (1969)
(holding that determining whether the House of Representatives has com-
ported with constitutional directives in declaring a candidate ineligible is not
a nonjusticiable political question).
62. For a telling example of the exercise of judicial restraint in a legisla-
tive eligibility dispute, see Scheibel v. Pavlak, 282 N.W.2d 843 (Minn. 1979).
In that case, voters asked the Minnesota Supreme Court to decide the legiti-
macy of a state congressional election where one candidate allegedly made
knowing misstatements about the other in campaign brochures. Id. at 844-46.
The Scheibel court began by acknowledging that pursuant to the Minnesota
Constitution, the legislature has unrivaled authority to determine the eligibil-
ity of its members. Id. at 847. The court held, therefore, that the judiciary
would be beyond the bounds of its constitutional powers by ruling on the mer-
its of the case. Id. at 848. The court went on, however, to recognize the
"unique necessities of the case," including the legislature's reliance on the
court. Id. at 851. In light of these necessities, the court felt compelled to is-
sue an advisory opinion to guide the legislature's resolution of the dispute. Id.
at 851-53.
63. CONN. CONST. art. III, § 18.
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the legislature to enact by supermajority. Perhaps predictably,
the legislature has been unable to agree by the requisite major-
ity so far. Disappointed voters asked the court to fill in the
blanks, but we held that we lacked jurisdiction to do so.' In
similar circumstances, most state courts would undoubtedly
conclude likewise.
C. EFFECT ON DEFINING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Apart from questions of jurisdiction, policy implications
derived from the separation of powers doctrine may shape the
form of judicial intervention even in cases where state courts
indubitably have authority to act on the merits. State courts
regularly are called upon to enforce state constitutional obli-
gations66 that, for sound reasons of federalism, federal courts
have declined to enforce. Because these state constitutional
rights impose affirmative obligations on the state, they differ
from federal civil rights guarantees, in kind as well as in text.
In construing and applying these uniquely state-centered
constitutional provisions, state courts have a dual assignment.
They must not only define the scope of the affirmative state
constitutional obligation at stake, but they must also deter-
mine whether the state has fulfilled its constitutional duty.
Defining the constitutional right is the quintessential judicial
obligation, but at least initially, elected officials, rather than
judges, can better determine the precise contours of the appro-
priate policy response.
The exercise of such judicial restraint illustrates the close
fit between the principles of separation of powers and the pru-
dential ideals identified many years ago by Professor Alexan-
der M. Bickel.6" Furthermore, as Professor Lawrence G. Sager
64. Id. art. III, § 18(b).
65. Nielsen v. State, 670 A.2d 1288, 1293 (Conn. 1996).
66. Examples of such state constitutional obligations include the right to
a public education and the right to public welfare. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art.
XIII, § 1 (placing a duty on the Minnesota legislature to maintain an effective
public school system throughout the state); N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (placing
on the New York legislature an affirmative duty to provide social welfare
services), construed in Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449,452 (N.Y. 1977).
67. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLITIcs (1962) (discussing judicial review
and the proper role of the judiciary in the federal government). For a treatment
of Bickel and his prudentialist approach to jurisprudence, see CALABRESI, supra
note 56, at 16-30 (citing Bickel as a primary source of the adjudicatory theory
of selective inaction) and Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy,
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has recently observed, such restraint exemplifies a practice of
what he describes as desirable judicial underenforcement of
constitutional norms." In his words, selective judicial under-
enforcement supports "the substantial virtues of ongoing
popular participation in the process by which we aspire to
identify and achieve the elements of a just politics."69 Courts
are not well positioned to enforce affirmative constitutional ob-
ligations. It makes judicial as well as political sense and com-
ports with the values represented by the doctrine of separation
of powers for courts to enlist the creative talents of the legisla-
tive and executive branches of government. 70 Given space and
time within which to respond, political actors are more able
than judges to identify remedial social strategies and social
programs that will be politically acceptable and that will en-
force the judicial mandate for the long term.
The soundness of these jurisprudential observations is
borne out by judicial experience. Like the Minnesota Supreme
Court in Skeen v. State,7 1 Connecticut courts have traveled this
road in cases dealing with state constitutional challenges to ine-
qualities in public school educational opportunities. Without
knowing what the popular reaction was to Skeen, I am nonethe-
less mindful of the reaction to Sheff v. O'Neill, 7 2 in which the
Connecticut Supreme Court recently held that the Hartford
public schools were operating unconstitutionally as a result of de
facto racial segregation." Controversial as that conclusion was,
the court was able, in substantial part, to defuse resistance by
expressly deferring to political decisionmaking for the negotia-
tion and prescription of a remedial implementation plan.74
As these examples illustrate, there are reasonably well-
defined jurisprudential principles, manifested principally in
state appellate court opinions, that govern the relationship be-
tween the three branches of government as a matter of state law.
94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985) (asserting that Bickel held to a political and judicial
philosophy based on prudence throughout his career).
68. Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thin-
ness of Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410, 421 (1993).
69. Id. at 417-18.
70. See id. at 421 (noting that while "claims of political justice have a con-
stitutional core, their satisfaction requires a welter of social decisions that
belong to the institutions of popular politics" and not to the judiciary).
71. 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993).
72. 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
73. Id. at 1289.
74. Id. at 1290-91.
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III. THE FUNCTIONAL EFFECT OF SEPARATION OF
POWERS IN STATE COURTS
The third and final point that deserves attention is the ex-
tent to which, as a matter of practice, these principles of sepa-
ration of powers affect the day-to-day functioning of state
courts. More particularly, what role do these principles play in
the daily operations of judicial administrators and staff? What
role do they play in the trenches, in the work of the trial
courts?
A. SPECIFIC EXAMPLES
Separation of powers manifests itself in daily judicial ad-
ministration through budgetary mandates jointly imposed by
the governor and the legislature. Although judicial independ-
ence would be enhanced by appropriation of a lump sum rather
than by a line-item budget, in Connecticut that battle remains
to be won.75
Separation of powers also manifests itself in the limited
role that judges play in the appointment of new members of the
judiciary. In Connecticut, although the governor nominates
from a list furnished by a judicial selection commission, 76 the
nomination is subject to legislative inquiry and approval. 77 No
judicial officer participates in any part of this process in any
official fashion.
Finally, separation of powers is manifested in the doctrinal
principle that courts should not give advisory opinions. Until
an actual case or controversy is presented for resolution, moste
state courts decline to exercise jurisdiction.
B. STATE TRIAL COURTS
Thus, structurally and doctrinally, state law with respect
to separation of powers does not differ conspicuously from fed-
eral law. The picture becomes very different, however, when
observing state trial courts in action. Operationally, at least in
Connecticut, separation of powers is largely irrelevant to much
75. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 4-60 to -107a (1994).
76. Id. § 51-44a(h).
77. Id. §§ 2-40 to -42.
78. For examples of state constitutions that give their courts constitu-
tional authority to give advisory opinions, see MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 3, art.
II; N.H. CONsT. pt. 2, art. 74; and R.I. CONST. art. 10, § 3.
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of the work of trial court judges and administrators. The gov-
erning principle is not separation but networking.
Let me cite a few examples that will be familiar to any ob-
server of judicial administrative responsibilities on the state
level. Whatever the propriety of formal advisory opinions on
pending legislation, state judicial administrators keep track of
pending bills in the state legislature. Deploying its adminis-
trative staff, the judiciary may influence the language, content,
and effect of pending legislation to minimize the risk of future
points of conflict. Judicial staff can also provide information
about the likely impact of legislative initiatives on the judici-
ary. In Connecticut as in Minnesota, advance notice of pending
legislation affords the judiciary the opportunity to exercise its
rule-making authority and amend judicial rules to conform to
forthcoming legislative policy initiatives. 79 Federal courts ap-
parently have much more limited opportunities to participate
in institutional interventions that emphasize collegial exchanges
rather than separation of powers.
The divergence between federal and state courts is even
more pronounced when one examines the myriad quasi-judicial
functions performed by modern state trial courts. Classically,
the judicial magistracy takes as its model the robed judge, sit-
ting on a bench, hearing evidence, and deciding the merits of a
case or instructing a jury on how to decide the merits. On any
given day in Connecticut, according to the best available esti-
mate, the work of no more than twenty percent of our trial
judges fits this classic model. The remaining eighty percent is
engaged in judicial work that is essential to the service of jus-
tice but looks very different from deciding cases in plenary
fashion from the bench.
Federal courts, like state courts, frequently engage in vari-
ous forms of alternative dispute resolution.0 In this respect,
state and federal courts are alike. Unlike federal courts, how-
ever, state courts also administer social services agendas that
transcend classic judicial responsibilities. Some examples from
Connecticut illustrate this point.
79. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-15a (requiring annual consultation be-
tween the supreme court rules committee and the legislative judiciary com-
mittee).
80. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994) (recognizing arbi-
tration as a form of dispute resolution and discussing proper arbitration pro-
cedure).
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In family court, judicial officers engage the services of
mental health professionals to protect children and help dys-
functional families defuse their anger.8' A statewide family
docket brings together a variety of specialists to assist the
judge in providing guidance to divorcing parties so they can
work out a lasting solution to their personal difficulties. Else-
where within the state, family court judges order parents
struggling through divorce to attend parenting classes,82 and
they go and they benefit. The subject matter of such judicial
interventions bears little resemblance to the mainstream judi-
cial agenda of even the recent past.
In a special drug court recently opened in New Haven, the
judge has the responsibility of identifying nonviolent offenders
who will benefit from a program combining corrective supervi-
sion by the court with therapeutic treatment for drug addic-
tion.83 The treatment part of the program includes residential
and outpatient placements, linkage to community support
services, and assistance with educational or employment is-
sues. The personnel providing the actual services are retained
by the judicial branch on a contract basis; they are not state
employees, but they are accountable to state employees. The
criminal defendant remains accountable to the judge at all
times. Again, judicial involvement to this degree in matters
that relate as much to rehabilitation as to punishment de-
scribes a new role for the judiciary.
In our victims' rights program, judicial staff advise victims
of their rights and provide funds to offset their losses.84 Al-
though this program is not staffed by judges, it involves judi-
cial administrators in an assignment that more closely resem-
bles the work of an executive branch agency than traditional
judicial branch responsibilities.
In undertaking these programs as part of the judicial so-
cial service agenda, judges and judicial staff fill roles that his-
torically would have been performed by private groups or other
branches of government. These roles have come to the judiciary
more by way of default than by design. The judicial engagement
81. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38c (authorizing a cooperative effort be-
tween the judicial branch and the state's attorney's office to create a family
violence response unit).
82. Id. § 46b-69b.
83. See 1995 Conn. Acts 131 (Reg. Sess.) (initiating the drug court pro-
gram).
84. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-209 (West Supp. 1996).
1562 [Vol. 81:1543
SEPARATION OF POWERS
usually results from intensive consultation and negotiation with
the executive and legislative branches. Whatever the relevant
pros and cons of judicial participation, concern for separation of
powers has not been high on anyone's list.
CONCLUSION
My closing question is this: Is this functional blurring of
the lines of executive, legislative, and judicial power a matter
for applause or for concern? Are we moving back toward the
parliamentary practices of colonial Connecticut? Should we do
so? Separation of powers is rooted in very important demo-
cratic values. If the judiciary is even indirectly involved in the
drafting of legislation, will it retain its independence to resolve
constitutional challenges to the validity of such legislation?
Perhaps more importantly, does such a role risk undermining
the appearance of judicial impartiality and independence? If a
judge embraces the role of a participant in the provision of so-
cial services, will the judge continue vigilantly to protect the
individual rights of the litigants and to act conscientiously on
their claims of innocence in the face of their need for therapy?
Again, even more importantly, will the judge risk being per-
ceived as having a personal stake or psychological investment
in the outcome, so as to cause litigants or the general public to
doubt the judge's impartiality? Finally, in a judicial world in
which accommodation with political actors has many visible
rewards for the judiciary, do we risk creating a judicial climate,
or risk being perceived as having created a judicial climate, in
which the voices of politically unrepresented minorities do not
get a fair hearing?
One way to approach these questions is to recast them in
the terms advanced by Professor Harry H. Wellington. In In-
terpreting the Constitution, Professor Wellington ventured the
opinion that "law made by judges must in the end be politically
digestible." 5 Political digestibility is a particularly urgent as-
piration for state courts, many of whose judges are elected, and
few of whose judges have lifetime tenure.
What counsel does the notion of political digestibility pro-
vide? Rigorous insistence on absolute separation of powers is
indigestible; rigid lines of demarcation cannot be reconciled
with the operational interdependence of the three branches of
85. HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 19 (1990).
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government that marks the modern state. However, wide-
spread abandonment of the political wisdom underlying the
separation of powers should also give us pause. The absence of
meaningful limitations on the power of any one branch of gov-
ernment, even in only some parts of its governmental opera-
tions, may also prove to be indigestible in the long run. It is
appropriate to wonder whether unchecked governmental power
anywhere, no matter how well intentioned and how expedient,
can provide enduring assurance of the full protection of indi-
vidual and civil rights that is basic to a democracy.
What guideposts should courts consider, and what multi-
factor analyses should courts invoke to decide where to locate
the proper midpoint between these unacceptable extremes?
How can we make sure that the calls for efficiency in moving
state court dockets and for constructive partnerships with the
other branches of state government do not seduce us away from
the bedrock principle of providing justice for all? These are
serious matters for every serious student of American courts.
We in the state courts urgently need the assistance of the
academy to clarify these issues and explore possible resolu-
tions. If there were easy answers, someone would have already
found them.
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